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ABSTRACT
The management of security,  operations and services in large scale enterprise networks is becoming  
more difficult due to complex security policies of the organizations and also due to dynamic changes in  
network topologies. Typically, the global security policy of an enterprise network is implemented in a  
distributed fashion through appropriate sets of access control rules (ACL rules) across various interface  
switches (layer 3 switches) in the network. In such networks, verification of the ACL implementations  
with respect to the security policies is a major technical challenge to the network administrators. This is  
difficult to achieve manually, because of the complex policy constraints (temporal access constraints)  
and the presence of hidden access paths in the network which may in turn violate one or more policy  
rules  implicitly.  The inconsistent  hidden access  paths  may be formed due  to  transitive  relationships  
between implemented service access paths in the network. Moreover, the complexity of the problem is  
compounded due to  dynamic changes in  network topologies.  In  any point  of  time,  the failure of  the 
network interfaces or links may change the network topology as a result alternative routing paths can be 
formed for forwarding various service packets. Hence, the existing security implementation (distribution  
of ACL rules) may not satisfy the policies. In this paper, a fault analysis module is incorporated along  
with the verification framework which as a whole can derive a correct ACL implementation with respect  
to a given security policy specification and can ensure that a correct security implementation is fault  
tolerant  to  certain  number  of  link  failures.  The  verification  module  can  find  the  correct  security  
implementation and the fault analysis module can find the number of link failures the existing security  
implementation can tolerate and still satisfy the security policy of the network.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The  services,  operations  and  management  of  today's  organizations  (industrial,  commercial, 
academic etc) are becoming increasingly dependent  on their enterprise LAN. Usually,  these 
LANs consist of a set of sub-networks or network zones (logical group of network elements or 
entities) corresponding to different departments or sections, connected through various interface 
switches (typically, Layer-3 switches). The network service accesses between these zones and 
also with the  external  network (e.g.,  Internet)  are  governed by the  global  network security  
policy of the organization. The global security policy of the network is defined as a collection of 
“permit”  and “deny”  service  access  rules  across  various  network zones  where the  services 
referred any network applications conforming to TCP/IP protocol. For example, some of the 
well-known network services are ssh, telnet, http etc. This global security policy is realized by 
configuring the zone interfaces with appropriate sets of access control lists (ACLs). 
 The major challenges related to the policy based security management in an enterprise LAN are 
stated as follows: 
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• To verify whether the security implementations (distribution of ACLs in the interface 
switches) conform to the global policy.
• To analyze whether a correct security implementation conforms to the global policy 
under dynamic changes in network topology.
The first issue states, given the global security policy of the LAN, the switches in the network 
must be programmed in such a way that the ACL rules in these switches together guarantee 
correct  and  precise  implementation  of  the  global  security  policy.  In  other  words,  we  must 
guarantee that service paths in the network which violate one or more global policy rules must 
be denied by the combination of switches on the path through their local ACL rules. As an 
example,  consider  a  typical  enterprise  network  shown  in  Fig.1.  The  example  network  is 
deployed as hierarchical networking architecture consisting of  Core,  Distribution  and  Access 
layers. Access layer includes two network zones, namely, ZONE_1 and ZONE_2. Moreover, the 
zones can be partitioned into sub-zones.  For example,  in  Fig.1,  ZONE_1 is  partitioned into 
SUBZONE_11,  SUBZONE_12 and so on. Here, the  Core includes three routers (R1, R2 and 
R3),  the  distribution  network  consists  of  two routers  (R4  and R5).  The  external  access  to 
Internet is realized through PROXY zone (consist of web proxy servers). 
Now, consider the following global security policy for the network: “Internet (http) access is  
NOT allowed from the ZONE_1”. This policy rule must be implemented by programming the 
ACL rules in the routers interfaces.  The first problem addressed in this paper is the task of 
verifying that a given implementation is correct. The verification problem is more complex than 
it appears at first glance. Firstly the security policies may be temporal, such as an organization 
has the requirement that the  http  access to be blocked between 0900-1700 hours in weekdays 
from a particular  network zone. Therefore it  is required to verify correctness at the various 
windows of time. Secondly, network services may be combined to define service access paths 
which are indirect or  hidden. For example, even if direct http access from the ZONE_1 to the 
PROXY in Fig.1 is blocked (say, by placing an appropriate deny rule in the router, R4), one can 
ssh/telnet from ZONE_1 to ZONE_2 (which may be allowed from ZONE_1) and access Internet 
ZONE_1 
10.0.0.0/10
10.0.0.1/16
INTERNET
10.1.0.1/16
SUBZONE_11 
10.0.0.0/16
SUBZONE_12 
10.1.0.0/16
SUBZONE_21
10.64.0.0/16
SUBZONE_22 
10.65.0.0/16
ZONE_2 
10.64.0.0/10
10.64.0.1/16
10.65.0.1/16
172.16.0.1/30
172.16.0.2/30
172.16.0.13/30
172.16.0.14/30
172.16.0.18/30
172.16.0.29/30
172.16.0.30/30
172.16.0.9/30
172.16.0.10/30
172.16.0.5/30
172.16.0.6/30 203.110.140.2/28
203.110.140.1/28
Core
PROXY
Distribution
Access
R1 R2
R3
R4 R5
L3 
Router
L2 
Switch
172.16.0.17/30
172.16.0.26/30
172.16.0.21/30
172.16.0.22/ 172.16.0.25/30
       Fig.1 A Typical Enterprise Network
57
International Journal of Computer Networks & Communications (IJCNC), Vol.1, No.2, July 2009
(which may be allowed for ZONE_2). Therefore, even though there is no direct http access path 
from ZONE_1, the actual intent of preventing internet access from that zone is not guaranteed. 
The combination of network services that can create hidden access paths for a specific service 
needs to be known for verification. This constitutes a significant amount of domain knowledge 
in the verification problem. In order to accommodate new types of services and thereby new 
combinations of network services, our decision framework provides formalism for specifying 
hidden access  rules.  In  our  previous  work  [24],  a  formal  verification  framework  has  been 
proposed to analyze the security policy implementations in an enterprise network considering 
these problems. 
   In  our  earlier  work  [24],  the  security  analysis  was  performed  considering  the  network 
topology to be static. However, in any point of time the failure of the interfaces may change the 
network topology which is  a  common circumstance  in  an enterprise  network.  Hence,  more 
challenging problem is to analyze a correct security implementation under network topology 
changes. In that case, the network service packets may be routed through alternative paths in the 
network hence the distribution of ACL rules may not satisfy the security policy.  This paper 
presents a graph based network access model for analyzing the robustness of a correct ACL 
implementation under arbitrary link failures. Basically,  it finds the maximum number of link 
failures  the  security  implementation  can  tolerate  and  still  satisfy  the  global  policy  of  the 
network.  The  proposed  fault  analysis  methodology  can  be  layered  at  the  bottom  of  the 
verification framework to extract a correct implementation under various network link failures. 
    The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the related work on network 
security policy specification,  security analysis  tools  and models.  In  section 3,  the proposed 
verification and fault analysis framework has been described. The verification of security policy 
implementations along with the experimental results has been presented in section 4. Section 5 
describes the fault analysis of security implementations.
2. RELATED WORK
The research works  on network security analysis  and  policy configurations  can  be broadly 
classified into three categories: (a) network firewall analysis algorithms and tools; (b) security 
policy  specification  languages;  and  (c)  network  security  and  fault  analysis  using  formal 
approaches.  However,  none  of  these  addresses  the  issue  of  hidden  access  path  analysis. 
Moreover, most of the works do not consider the dynamic network topology changes in their 
analysis. Though the present work focuses on formal verification and fault analysis of security 
policy implementations, a brief overview of all the categories has been presented in this section. 
Existing literatures on firewall analysis primarily concentrate on inconsistency and redundancy 
checks but most of those are not formally verified. Tools that allow user queries for firewall 
analysis  and  management  include  Firmato  [1]  and  Lumeta  [2].  These  tools  can  specify an 
abstract network access control policy and firewall rules which satisfy that policy but lacks in 
incorporating  temporal  constraints  and  hidden  rule  analysis.  Eronen  and  Ziting  [3]  have 
implemented an expert system for inconsistency detection. Al-Shaer and Hamed [4] worked on 
the  Firewall  Policy  Advisor.  But  both  of  these  tools  can  handle  a  simple  set  of  policy 
constraints. The work by Guttman et al. [9] focuses on high level modelling of firewall and 
network configurations that satisfy a given policy but the policy specifications are more general. 
Researchers proposed different high level network security policy languages, namely,  HLFL 
[6], Firmato [1], FLIP [7] etc. The high level firewall language (HLFL) project is an approach to 
translate the high level firewall rules into useful rules for IPChains, Netfilter, and many others. 
The approach does an automatic translation, but it lacks important features such as detecting and 
preventing the conflicts in the firewall rules. FLIP, most recently proposed high level conflict 
free firewall policy language for enforcing access control based security and ensuring seamless 
configuration management. In FLIP, security policies are defined as high level service oriented 
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goals,  which  can  be  translated  automatically  into  access  control  rules  to  be  distributed  to 
appropriate enforcement devices. But still it does not address temporal access constraints and 
hidden  access  path  analysis.  A  high  level  language,  namely,  Extended  Security  Policy 
Specification Language (ESPSL) has been proposed as a part of this framework. The unique 
feature of the language is simple constructs for specifying temporal policy rules. 
There are few works on network security analysis using formal approaches. The FIREMAN 
Toolkit [5] is an example to detect inconsistencies and redundancies in network of firewalls. 
The set of all possible requests is formulated and model checking is used to divide the set into 
those which are accepted, those which are rejected, and those for which no rule applies. The tool 
can handle large set of firewall rules since it uses an efficient BDD representation. The Network 
Policy Enforcement tool [11] is one of the more recent tools in this line of work. Ritchey and 
Amman  [12]  shows  how  model  checking  can  be  used  to  analyze  network  vulnerabilities. 
Another recent work is proposed by Matousek, Rysavy, Rab, and Sveda [13] on formal model 
for network wide security analysis. They model the network topology with changing link states 
and deploy bounded model checking of network security properties using SAT-based decision 
procedure. However, this work is unable to ensure whether a correct security implementation is 
fault  tolerant  under  arbitrary  link  failures.  Also,  they  enumerate  all  possible  link  state 
combinations in a network for their analysis  which may lead to state explosion problem for 
large  scale  networks.  Matsumoto  and  Bouhoula  [16]  propose  a  SAT  based  approach  for 
verifying  firewall  configurations  with respect  to security policy requirements.  However,  the 
notion of hidden access paths and formalizing the verification problem in their presence has not 
been  addressed  earlier.  Again,  a  complete  framework  for  analyzing  the  correctness  of  the 
security policy implementations under network topology changes has not been proposed earlier. 
3. PROPOSED VERIFICATION AND FAULT ANALYSIS FRAMEWORK
The proposed verification and fault analysis framework shown in Fig.2 primarily focuses on the 
following issues: 
• Conflict-free specification and modelling of the global security policy of an enterprise 
LAN using the proposed policy specification language, ESPSL.
• Extraction  of  the  implementation  model  from the  distributed  access  control  (ACL) 
implementation in the network;
• Hidden access path analysis on the ACL implementation model;
• Reduction  of  policy  and  ACL  implementation  models  into  boolean  functions  and 
formulation of a QSAT (satisfiability of quantified Boolean formula) problem;
• Solving the satisfiability problem using an efficient QBF SAT solver;
• Fault analysis on a correct ACL implementation model under network link failures. 
The framework consists of two interlinked modules: 1) Verification Module 2) Fault Analysis 
Module. The Verification module models the global security policy in an enterprise LAN using 
a policy specification language; then extracts  an implementation model  from the distributed 
ACL implementation  corresponding  to  the  policy;  finally  verifies  the  ACL implementation 
model  with the policy model  using boolean satisfiability analysis  (SAT).  The fault  analysis 
module takes a correct ACL implementation with the underlying network topology and finds the 
maximum number of network link failures it can tolerate to satisfy the global policy.
A  policy  specification  language,  namely,  ESPSL  (Extended  Security  Policy  Specification 
Language) has been proposed for modelling the global security policy. The inter-rule conflicts 
between the policy rules are removed by maintaining a complete rule order in the rule set. The 
conflict-free policy specification represents the policy model, MP.
59
International Journal of Computer Networks & Communications (IJCNC), Vol.1, No.2, July 2009
An  implementation  model  MI is  extracted  from  the  distributed  ACL  implementation 
corresponding to the global policy for the network. It typically consists of set of ACL rules 
distributed  across  various  network  interfaces.  The  hidden  access  path  analysis  procedure 
incorporates  extra  rules  in  the  implementation  model  based  on  the  transitive  relationships 
between  various  service  access  paths.  The  inter-rule  conflicts  and  topology  information  is 
removed from the ACL rule base. For the purpose of verification, MP and MI are reduced into 
boolean  models.  It  requires  reduction  of  the  rule  components  and  their  inter  relations  into 
boolean functions. The hidden access path analysis procedure is implemented by reducing the 
hidden rules into a set of quantified boolean clauses which makes the procedure efficient and 
fast.  After boolean model reduction, a Q-SAT query is formulated as f  = MP  ⊕ MI ,  and is 
represented in QDIMACS CNF standard [17]. Finally, the module solves the satisfiability of the 
query,  f, using  quaffle  QBF SAT solver [15] [18]. The output from the SAT solver indicates 
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SAT/UNSAT, where, SAT result indicates the ACL implementation is incorrect with respect to 
the policy specification. Thus the verification module helps the administrator to debug the ACL 
rule distribution towards a correct ACL implementation. 
The Fault Analysis module takes a correct ACL implementation model (correct distribution of 
ACL  rules  in  the  network  interfaces)  and  the  underlying  network  topology  and  finds  the 
maximum number  of  link failure it  can tolerate so that  it  still  conforms the global  security 
policy. This module stems from modelling the network topology and ACL rules as a network 
access model and then formation of the  service flow graphs (GS) under each network service 
considering the “permit”/“deny” ACL rules associated to the network access model. Then the 
module finds the min-cut, χS (minimum sized edge cut) for each service flow graph GS. Finally, 
it finds the χN = min(χS) (smallest min-cut of all the service flow graphs) which represents the 
fault tolerance value corresponding to the correct ACL implementation under the network.
4. VERIFICATION OF SECURITY POLICY IMPLEMENTATION
The security policy verification module consists of three sub-modules. 1) Policy specification 
module  2)  ACL  Implementation  module  3)  QSAT  based  Verification  module.  The  Policy 
specification component models the global security policy in a high level language, ESPSL and 
produces  a  conflict-free  security  policy  model  (MP).  The  implementation  module  takes  the 
distributed ACL implementation corresponding to the global security policy as an input and 
extracts  a  conflict  free  topology  independent  implementation  model  (MI).  The  verification 
module reduces the policy and implementation models into boolean clauses. It should be noted 
that the  hidden access path analysis procedure is incorporated in the implementation model 
which  typically  adds  new quantified  rules  in  the  boolean  implementation  model  MI.  After 
reducing the models into boolean clauses, a Q-SAT query is formulated by taking exclusive-OR 
between the  models,  i.e.,  f  =  MP  ⊕ MI and represented in  QDIMACS CNF standard  [17]. 
Finally, the module solves the satisfiability of the query, f, using quaffle QBF Solver [18].
4.1. Policy Specification Module
The security policy of a network defines a set of parameterized functional rules on flow of 
packets between different network zones. The specification language must express the complex 
security  constraints  correctly.  As  a  part  of  the  verification  framework,  a  language,  namely 
Extended Security Policy Specification Language (ESPSL) has been proposed. In the following 
section, the various constructs of the proposed language are described. Some of the language 
constructs described in our earlier work [24] has been modified in this paper. 
4.1.1. Network Topology Specification
The ESPSL has the following constructs to describe the network topology.
Zone: A  zone  is  a  logical  unit  consisting  of  workstations,  servers  or  other  systems  in  the 
network, usually refers to a particular section of an organization. It is represented by IP address 
block(s) and it referred by the IP address block(s) or by a symbolic name. Further, a zone can be 
partitioned into multiple disjoint sub-zones. For example ZONE_1 can be defined as follows.
Zone ZONE_11 [10.0.0.0-10.0.255.255]; Zone ZONE_12 [10.1.0.0-10.1.255.255];
Zone ZONE_1 [ZONE_11, ZONE_12];
Router: Routers are interconnecting Layer 3 switches for connecting various sub-networks. A 
router can be connected to a network zone or another router. It consists of set of interfaces.
Interface: An interface is the connecting link between a zone and a router or multiple routers. 
Each interface is identified by a unique IP address. 
Interface L12 [172.16.0.13]; Interface L13 [172.16.0.5]; Interface L14 [172.16.0.2];
Interface L15 [172.16.0.17]; Router R1 [L12, L13, L14, LR15];
61
International Journal of Computer Networks & Communications (IJCNC), Vol.1, No.2, July 2009
4.1.2. Network Service and Policy Rule Specification
The ESPSL has the following constructs to specify the network services and policy rules.
Service: Network service is defined by a network protocol and a predicate associated with it. 
Each predicate defines the service port numbers or port ranges.
Service http = TCP [port = 80]; Service ssh = TCP [port>20 AND port<23];
Policy Rule: A policy rule defines a service access path between a source and a destination zone 
under some constraints (optional). The static rules do not include temporal access constraints, 
whereas temporal rules include such constraints. ESPSL models only time dependent temporal 
constraints which can be combination of day and time range specifications.
Permit ssh(ZONE_1, ZONE_2); 
Deny http(ZONE_1, PROXY) [const = week_day(0800-1700)];
4.2. ACL Implementation Module
The global security policy of an enterprise LAN is implemented through a set of access control 
rules (ACL) applied to various interfaces of the access switches (or routers) in a distributed 
manner.  There  are various  device specific standards for  specifying  access  control  rules e.g. 
Cisco  standard  ACL [8].  Most  of  the  standards  are  logically  similar  in  the  context  of 
implementing basic security policy of a network. Cisco standard ACL has some extra features to 
represent temporal constraints and is widely used in large scale networks. In our approach, a 
model  is  extracted  from  the  distributed  ACL  implementation  corresponding  to  the  global 
security policy of a network. This process involves following phases; (a) Translating ACL rules 
into service flow rules (b) Resolving inter-rule conflicts and topology dependency (c) Hidden 
access path analysis.
4.2.1. Translating ACL Implementation into Service Flow Rule base
This phase translates the distributed ACL implementation into a service flow rule base which is 
stored  in  a  3-level  index  structure.  Each  service  flow  rule  consists  of  rule  header  and  its 
functional clause.  Rule header component  holds binding information of the rule to an ACL 
group and a router interface. Functional clause holds the components of each ACL rule. The 
specifications of the functional components are similar to our policy model. The service flow 
rule structure is shown in Table 1.
                                               Table 1. Service Flow Rule Structure
<F_Rule>:: <Rule_header> <Functional_clause>
<Rule_header>:: <router_id> <Interface_bind>
<Interface_bind>::<interface_id><acl_gr_no>
<Functional_clause>:: 
<action><service>(<src_IP>,<dest_IP>)[<const>]
<Service>:: <protocol> <port no | service_name>
<Action>:: permit | deny
A 3-level index structure is used to store the functional components of various ACL rules along 
with their bindings to ACL groups and router interfaces. First two level of the index holds the 
rule header and the leaf level holds the functional components. Each leaf level node can hold 
components of multiple rules under the same ACL group or router interface. Each leaf level 
node is represented as a linked list  of structured nodes where each structure node holds the 
functional components of a single ACL rule. The service flow rule base generated from this 
phase does not change the semantics of the distributed ACL implementation.
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4.2.2. Resolving Inter-rule Conflicts and Network Topology Dependency
The  proposed  SAT  based  verification  framework  aims  at  verifying  the  distributed  ACL 
implementation with the global policy specification through reduction of the rule bases into a 
set of boolean clauses. So, it is required to represent the distributed ACL rules into a single ACL 
rule base which is inter-rule conflict free and network topology independent. It firstly requires 
removal of various inter-rule conflicts from the service flow rule sets associated to each router 
interface separately, and then merging the conflict free rule sets in a single rule base. The inter-
rule conflicts may occur due to rule component dependencies as described follows.
Rule subsuming conflict: Consider a pair of ACL rules P1 and P2 under the same ACL group 
where P1 precedes P2; 
P1: Permit TCP X1, Y1 eq ssh; 
P2: Deny TCP X, Y eq ssh; such that X1 ⊂ X and Y1 ⊂ Y.
Here, the source and destination of P2 subsume those of P1 and the rules are top-down order 
dependent. The pair of rules semantically means that "ssh" service access from any source in X 
to any destination in Y is denied except those where source and destination are X1 and Y1 
respectively. To make these rules conflict-free (i.e., order independent), requires addition of two 
new rules P2’ and P2’’ in place of P2 where,
P2’: Deny TCP (X-X1), Y eq ssh; 
P2’’: Deny TCP X, (Y-Y1) eq ssh.
Similar type of conflict may occur between a pair of static and temporal ACLs under the same 
ACL group with same service component. 
Rule Over-riding conflict: Consider a pair of ACL rules P3 and P4 under the same ACL group 
where P3  precedes P4 in the rule set, 
P3: Permit TCP X, Y eq http; 
P4: Deny TCP X, Y eq http.
Here P3 overrides P4 that means P4 can't  hold. As the rule order is top down, resolving this 
conflict requires deletion of P4 from the rule base. On the other hand, consider a pair of rules P5 
and P6,
P5: Permit X, Y eq ssh; 
P6: Permit Z, W eq ssh; such that, ((X⊂ Z) ∧ (Y ⊂ W)) ∨ ((Z ⊂ X) ∧ (W ⊂ X)).
In such cases where the rules hold the above dependency relation and their service and action 
components are identical, order-major rule (P5) overrides the order-minor rule (P6) which means 
P6 can't hold. Resolving this conflict requires deletion of P6 from the rule base.
The inter-rule conflict removal procedure resolves these conflicts from the rule base through 
selective insertion and deletion of rules to or from the rule base. Once the conflicts from each 
rule set are resolved, the main procedure removes the binding information and merges the rule 
sets  into  a  single  rule  base,  namely,  Conflict_Free_ACL_Base which  is  network  topology 
independent.  Then,  the  hidden access  path  analysis  procedure  is  applied  on  the  rule  base, 
Conflict_Free_ACL_Base, which is described in the following section.
4.2.3. Hidden Access Path Analysis
The hidden service access paths may exist in a network due to the transitive access relationships 
between various known network services.  In section 1, it  has been shown how hidden  http 
access paths may appear in a network through conflicting ssh service. The hidden access paths 
can be modelled through a set of formulas in predicate logic. For example, the hidden  http 
access paths can be formally represented as follows.
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∀X∀Z((∃Y, ssh(X,Y)∧http(Y,Z)⇒http(X,Z))--------(1)
∀X∀Z((∃Y, telnet(X,Y)∧http(Y,Z)⇒http(X,Z))--------(2)
∀X∀Z((∃Y,∃T, ssh(X,Y)[T]∧http(Y,Z)[T]⇒http(X,Z)[T])--------(3)
∀X∀Z((∃Y,∃T, telnet(X,Y)[T]∧http(Y,Z)[T]⇒http(X,Z)[T])--------(4)
As mentioned above, the formulas (1) and (2) represent static hidden http access paths whereas, 
(3) and (4) represent the temporal hidden http access paths with some time constraint T. Here, 
X, Y, Z ∈ All_Zone represent network zones and All_Zone represents total (internal) network 
which is disjoint union of distinct network zones.
For the proper assessment of the implementation with respect to the policy model,  all  such 
hidden  access  paths  should  be  incorporated  in  the  implementation  model.  Basically,  the 
proposed hidden access path analysis procedure modifies the inter-rule conflict free rule base, 
Conflict_Free_ACL_Base, by inserting new rules or updating the access permissions of existing 
rules.  The  procedure  consists  of  two  major  phases.  First  phase  modifies  the  rule  base  by 
analyzing transitivity between every pair of rules under similar service types and the second 
phase modifies the rule base by analyzing such relationships between every pair of rules under 
different  service  types.  This  procedure  is  directly  implemented  in  SAT  reduction  phase  of 
implementation model depicted in next section. It basically reduces the set of predicate logic 
formulas  (representing  the  hidden  access  rules)  into  set  of  quantified  boolean  clauses  and 
incorporates those clauses to the boolean model  corresponding to  Conflict_Free_ACL_Base. 
The complete boolean model generated through this procedure represents the implementation 
model MI .
4.3. QSAT Based Verification Module
QSAT based approach reduces the verification problem into a quantified boolean formula f and 
checks  its  satisfiability.  Although  satisfiability  analysis  is  NP  complete  problem,  still  this 
technique is becoming popular today due the tremendous time tradeoffs of modern SAT solvers 
[10]  and  QBF  SAT  solvers  [18]  [19].  In  our  approach,  both  the  security  policy  and 
implementation models are reduced into set of boolean clauses,  MP and MI respectively. Then 
satisfiability of  the  formula  f  =  MP  ⊕ MI is  checked using a  QBF SAT solver.  It  requires 
translation of the formula into conjunctive normal form (CNF). The formula, f, contains clauses 
over quantified variables due to the inclusion of hidden access path analysis in  MI.  So, it is 
translated into QDIMACS CNF [17] format  and satisfiability is  checked using  quaffle QBF 
SAT solver [18].
4.3.1. Boolean Reduction of the Models
In this phase, policy and implementation rule bases are reduced into a set of boolean clauses. 
The rules in the models are broadly classified into two major types: (a) Generic access control 
rules which are common to both models  (b)  Hidden access rules which are specific  to the 
implementation model. Although the boolean model reduction algorithms are nit the scope of 
this paper but these procedures are briefly described here. 
Policy Model Reduction: The policy model consists of a set of generic access control rules. 
The reduction of the policy model firstly requires the mapping of the generic rule components 
into a set of boolean variables. The rule components include service (protocol, port number), 
source zone, destination zone and time constraint. A network zone can be specified as single IP 
address or range of IP addresses. So, source and destination zones are mapped to 32 boolean 
variables  each.  A  range  of  IP  addresses  can  be  translated  using  disjunction  (∨)  operator. 
Address ranges with masks can be reduced by bit-wise anding (&&) the masks with the base 
addresses.  Similarly,  protocol  type  and  port  numbers  are  mapped  into  appropriate  boolean 
variables. In both the models, time constraints are modelled as disjunction of its valid periods. 
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Each valid period can contain day of week, day of a month, and hours in a day as component. 
Each component of a valid period is mapped into a set of boolean variables.
Algorithm 1: Boolean Reduction of Policy Model
Functional mapping of rule components into boolean variables:
Protocol(P):FP(p0 ,p1)
PortNo(I):FI(i0,i1,...,i7)
Src_IP(SIP):FS(s0,s1,...,s31)
Dst_IP(DIP):FD(d0,d1,...,d31)
Time(T):FT(dt0,dt1,dt2,t0,..,t4)
Action(g):A(g)
Algorithm:: Reduce_Pol_Model()
Input: Policy Rule Base {PR1, PR2,.., PRN}
Output: Reduced Policy Model MP
1. BEGIN
2.     X1=1/True
3.     FOR each policy rule PRi (i=1 to N)
4.         Ri =Reduce_Gen_Rule(PRi)
5.         Xi+1 ⇔ ((Xi ∨ Ri) ∧ gi) ∨ ((Xi∧ ¬Ri) ∧ ¬gi))
6.     END FOR
7.     MP ⇔ XN+1
8. END 
Where,   [gi =1, if action(Ri) = “permit”
                   = 0 , if action(Ri)= “deny”].
Procedure: Reduce_Gen_Rule()
Input: A generic rule PRi
Output: Boolean Reduction of the rule PRi 
1. BEGIN
2.       Pi  ⇔ FPi (p0,p1) ∧
3.       Ii ⇔FIi(i0,i1,..,i7 ) ∧
4.       Servi ⇔  (Pi ∧ Ii) ∧
5.       SIPi ⇔FSi(s0,s1,..,s31) ∧
6.       DIPi ⇔FDi(d0,d1,..,d31) ∧
7.       Ti ⇔FTi(dt0,dt1,dt2,t0,..,t4) ∧
8.       Ri⇔(Servi ∧SIPi  ∧ DIPi ∧Ti)
9.       Return Ri
10. END
After rule components mapping, the policy model reduction algorithm functionally reduces each 
rule into a boolean clause [as conjunction of rule components], translates each clause based on 
the action component (“permit/1” or “deny/0”) and finally combines all translated clauses into a 
single boolean clause. The boolean model generated from this phase defines the policy model, 
MP. The functional mapping of the policy rule components and main policy model reduction 
procedure is presented in Algorithm 1.
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Implementation Model Reduction:
This phase firstly reduces the generic ACL rules corresponding to  Conflict_Free_ACL_Base, 
which is similar to policy rule reduction. Then the hidden rules are reduced sequentially and 
associated  to  the  reduced  generic  rule  base  (represented  by,  boolean  model,  YN+1,  refer 
Algorithm2). It finally produces the reduced implementation model MI . 
Algorithm 2: Boolean Reduction of Implementation Model 
Algorithm:: Reduce_Imp_Model()
Input: Conflict_free_ACL_Base {IR1, IR2,.., IRN}
Output: Reduced Implementation model, MI
1. BEGIN
2.      Y1=1/True
3.       FOR each generic ACL rule IRi (i=1 to N)
4.           FRi = Reduce_Gen_Rule(IRi)
5.           Yi+1⇔((Yi∨ FRi) ∧ gi)∨ ((Yi∧ ¬FRi) ∧ ¬gi))
6.        END FOR
7.    MI = Reduce_hidden_rule()
8.  END 
Procedure: Reduce_hidden_rule()
Input: Generic rule model, YN+1, and Hidden rule set {HR1,…, HRN}
Output: Reduced Implementation model, MI 
1. BEGIN
2.     FOR each reduced generic rule FRi (i=1 to N)
3.        TDIPi ⇔DIPi ∧
4.        DSIPi ⇔FDSi(TDIPi,s0,s1,..,s31)
5.     END FOR
6.     Encode_comp() 
7.     M0 =YN+1
8.     FOR each hidden rule HRi (i=1 to N)
9.        M1 =Update_model_bool_hidden(M(i-1), HRi)
10.   END FOR
11.   MI =MN
12. END
Procedure: Update_model_bool_hidden(M0, HR1)
Input: Boolean model M0 and hidden rule HR1
[HR1:: ∀X∀Z, ∃Y, ssh(X,Y) ∧ ssh(Y,Z) ⇒ ssh(X,Z)]
Output: Updated model M1 with reduction of hidden rule HR1
1. BEGIN
2.    ∀X∀Z,∃Y, IF ssh(X,Y) ∈ M0 and ssh(Y,Z)∈ M0 THEN
3.       M1⇔ M0 ∨ ssh(X,Z)
4.       Return M1
5.    END IF
6. END
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The hidden rule reduction procedure starts with some pre-processing tasks. At first, for each 
generic ACL rule, the destination and the source matches to the destination are mapped to set of 
boolean  variables  other  than  their  primary  mapped  variables.  Then the  total  set  of  distinct 
source,  destination and time-constraint  are functionally encoded to set  of  boolean variables. 
These tasks are to enhance the hidden rule reduction procedures. After that, the main procedure 
sequentially reduces each hidden rule into a quantified boolean formula and updates the generic 
ACL rule model, YN+1. Initially, YN+1 is assigned to a model M0, then it is sequentially updated 
by  the  hidden  rules  to  produce  intermediate  models,  M1,  M2 and  so  on.  The  final  model 
generated from this phase represents the reduced implementation model MI. The procedure for 
the reduction of implementation model is presented in Algorithm 2.
4.3.2. QBF SAT Solver and Q-SAT Query Formation
We have used quaffle QBF solver [18] as the verification tool. It takes Q-SAT query in standard 
conjunctive normal form (CNF) and checks its satisfiability.  The commonly used format for 
storing quantified CNF formula (of QSAT problems) in ASCII files is QDIMACS format [17].
Q-SAT query for our problem: "Is the ACL implementation model (MI) exactly equals to policy 
model (MP)". So, it is sufficient to check the un-satisfiability of the expression: f = MP ⊕ MI. In 
the previous subsection, boolean reduction of MI and MP has been described. In the framework, 
the QSAT query is translated into CNF using standard algorithm for 3-CNF satisfiability [14]. 
The  algorithm  forms  truth  table  for  every  sub-expression  containing  disjunctions  of 
conjunctions and converts it into CNF applying De-Morgan's rules where each clause contains 
at most 3 literals. For example, equivalent CNF for the SAT query f is represented as (MP ∨ MI)  
∧(¬MP ∨ MI). The CNF formula is represented into QDIMACS format and is provided as input 
to quaffle QBF solver. It checks the SAT or UNSAT of the formula.
4.4. Verification Results
The verification framework has been tested with various test cases of implementations under 
defined policy specifications in an enterprise LAN. Few of those experimentations are shown in 
Table  2.  It  shows  number  of  policy  and  ACL  rules  along  with  the  number  of  variables, 
quantified variables and clauses in the reduced QSAT query under each test case.
                                                         Table 2. Verification Results
Test 
Cases
P I V Q C Quaffle 
Output 
TCR TSAT TE 
TC1 10 10 80 21 159 SAT 2.84 7.16 1.19
TC2 23 25 88 24 198 UNSAT 4.57 8.17 0.88
TC3 23 28 88 24 201 SAT 4.63 8.34 0.75
TC4 38 38 94 28 231 UNSAT 5.21 9.33 1.17
TC5 45 32 94 22 215 SAT 5.11 8.47 0.93
TC6 45 45 90 25 245 UNSAT 5.76 9.17 1.12
P: Number of policy rules
I: Number of ACL rules in Conflict_free_ACL_Base
V: Number of boolean variables in the Q-SAT query
Q: Number of quantified variables in the Q-SAT query
C: Number of CNF clauses in the Q-SAT query
TCR: ACL Conflict and topology dependency Removal time (in seconds)
TSAT: SAT reduction time (in seconds)
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TE: quaffle runtime (in milliseconds)
TC: Test cases
The result shows SAT/UNSAT of the Q-SAT query (i.e.) along with the SAT reduction time 
and  quaffle execution time  to  generate  the  outputs.   Here,  the  SAT result  implies  that  the 
implementation  does  not  satisfy  the  policy  (i.e.,  MP  ≠ MI)  whereas  the  UNSAT  implies 
implementation satisfies the policy (i.e., MP = MI). The SAT reduction time is much higher than 
the SAT execution time. The SAT reduction time is linearly dependent on the number of policy, 
ACL  rules  and  hidden  rule  reduction  time.  Normally,  hidden  rule  reduction  time  remains 
constant  as  the number  of  hidden rules is  fixed in the  model.  On the  other hand the ACL 
Conflict removal time is dependent on the number of ACL rules and their inter-dependency. 
5. FAULT ANALYSIS OF SECURITY POLICY IMPLEMENTATION
The pre-requisite for the fault analysis module is a correct ACL implementation with respect to 
the global policy specification. The correct ACL implementation is extracted by the verification 
module of the framework described earlier. The flow diagram for the fault analysis procedure is 
shown in Fig.3 To start with, the network with the ACL rule distribution is modeled as a graph 
described as follows.
5.1. Network Access Model
Definition 1: A network access model is defined as a 3-tuple N = <D, I, F>, where, 
• D is a finite set of network devices. Again network devices (D) can be of two types: DR 
indicates  a  finite  set  of  network  routers  and  $DE$ indicates  the  end  point  devices 
(network zones, workstations or web servers etc) 
• I⊆{D×D} is a finite set of network interfaces between network devices, such that for 
every physical interface between D1 and D2 there is a pair of lines or channels: I12 =<D1, 
D2> and I21 = <D2, D1}>. Again, network interfaces (I) can be of two types: IE ⊆{DR× 
DE} {DE × DR} indicates set of network interfaces which connect end point devices 
to routers; and IR⊆{DR×DR} indicates set of interfaces between a pair of routers.
• F is a finite set of ACL rules assigned to the edges of the graph.
Because, ACL rules can be applied in both directions of the link, we consider that the set I 
contain for every link two items, <Di, Dj> and <Dj, Di>. Typically, there are two links between a 
pair of routers based on the direction of flow which are represented as separate port in our 
generic module. According to this definition, the network access model for the example network 
shown in section 1 is  a graph shown in figure  Fig.3.  This network model  is  considered as 
running example for rest of the analysis.
5.1. Service Flow Graph Formation
In this phase, based on the correct ACL implementation {the ACL rules associated to various 
network interfaces} service flow graphs are formulated for each network service. A service flow 
graph is defined as follows:
Definition 2: A service flow graph GS<DS,  IS> under the network service S is defined as a 
connected directed sub-graph of the network model N<D, I, F>, where DS ⊆ D and IS ⊆ I such 
that ∀IS, F(IS) • action = “permit”.
The definition states that the service flow graph includes only the edges on which corresponding 
service access is allowed. The service flow graphs are formed by simply removing the edges 
from  N which are associated with “deny” rules under a particular service. Then to keep the 
graph connected, the disconnecting nodes (a subset of D) are removed. For example, consider 
the security policy for our running network access model:
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Policy1: “ssh access is not allowed from ZONE_1 to ZONE_2 whereas the reverse flow is 
allowed”
Now, consider the ACL implementation scenario corresponding to the policy:
Implementation1: 
Permit ssh(ZONE_2, ZONE_1); Deny ssh(ZONE_1, ZONE_2);
Permit ssh(R1, R4); Permit ssh(R2,R4); Permit ssh(R5, R4);
Deny ssh(R1, R3); Deny ssh(R1, R2); Deny ssh(R2, R3);
Deny ssh(R4, R1); Deny ssh(R2, R5).
The “ssh” service flow graph corresponding to Implementation1 is shown in Fig.4(a).
Similarly, consider the following security policy described in section 1.
Policy2: “Internet (http) access is NOT allowed from the ZONE_1”. 
ZONE_1[10.0.0.0/10] ZONE_2 [10.64.0.0/10]
PROXY
R1 R2
R4 R5
SUBZONE_11
     10.0.0.0/16
SUBZONE_12 
10.1.0.0/16 SUBZONE_22   
  10.65.0.0/16
SUBZONE_21
   10.64.0.0/16
Fig.3 Network Access Model Corresponding to Fig.1
69
R3
International Journal of Computer Networks & Communications (IJCNC), Vol.1, No.2, July 2009
The Implementation2 shows a correct ACL implementation corresponding to the policy.
Implementation2: 
 Permit http(ZONE_2, PROXY); Deny http(ZONE_1, PROXY);
Permit http(R5, R1); Permit http(R5, R2); Permit http(R1, R3);
Permit http(R2, R3); Permit http(R3, PROXY); Deny http(any, any).
Here, the last rule indicates that all the access paths are treated as default “deny” except those 
which are explicitly defined prior to the rule. The “http” service flow graph corresponding to 
that implementation is shown in  Fig.4(b). In this way, service flow graphs are formed under 
each network service.
5.2. Fault Analysis under Network Link Failures
The proposed fault analysis problem can be stated as follows: “To find the maximum number 
of link failures, the network access model N can tolerate and still satisfy the security policy of  
the network”
To solve this problem, we introduce the concept of critical links.
Definition 3: A critical link ECR in a service flow graph, GS is an edge which connects an end 
point device, DEi to a network router, DRj; i.e., ∀ECR:{DEi × DRj} ⊆ IE. 
These edges are critical because of the fact that the failure of any of these edges makes the ACL 
implementation incorrect unless they are associated with “deny”  service access rules. In our 
analysis, it is considered that there are no critical link failures. However, from the definition of 
the service flow graph, it is implied that the critical links with “deny” access control rules do not 
exist in a service flow graph. Hence, the critical links are removed from the service flow graphs 
prior to the fault analysis procedure.
The fault analysis problem is solved by finding the size of the minimum cut (min-cut) in each 
service flow graph GS excluding the critical edges which basically represents the fault tolerance 
value (χs)  for  that  service S.  Then the minimum of the fault  tolerance values associated to 
different  service  flow  graphs,  i.e.,  χN =  min{χs}  is  calculated  which  represents  the  fault 
tolerance value for the complete ACL implementation under the network access model N. The 
fault analysis algorithm is presented in Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3: Fault Analysis on Network Access Model
    ZONE_1    ZONE_2
R1 R2
R4 R5
SUBZON
E_11
SUBZON
E_12
SUBZON
E_22
SUBZON
E_21
        ZONE_2:
PROXY
R1
R2
R3
R5
SUBZONE_22
SUBZONE_21
  
Fig.4 (a) “ssh” service flow graph; (b) “http” service flow graph
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1. BEGIN
2.   FOR each network service S
3.       Generate the service flow graph, GS, from the network access model, N
4.   END FOR 
5.   FOR each service flow graph, GS
6.       Remove the critical links ECR from the graph
7.        Find the min-cut of GS
8.        χS = Size of the min-cut of GS
9.    END FOR
10.  χN = min(χS)
11.   Return χN
12. END
There are standard algorithms [21] [22] [23] to find minimum cut in a directed graph which uses 
its  close relationship to the maximum flow problem.  These algorithms  find a minimum cut 
separating a designated source s from a designated sink node t, and then by varying the sink 
node, find a minimum cut in a directed graph G as a sequence of at most 2n-2 maximum flow 
problems. However, in the present approach, the efficient algorithm presented by J. Hao and J. 
B. Orlin [20] is implemented. It solves the minimum cut problem in a graph in a time Ο(|V||E| 
log(|V|2/|E|). The algorithm starts with a source node s ⊆ S and solves (n-1) minimum S-t cut 
problems,  where  each  node  in  {N-{s}}  is  considered  as  a  sink  node  for  one  of  these  n-1 
problems. After having found the minimum cut for sink node $t$, the algorithm transfer t to S 
and select the node with minimum distance label. The algorithm, carefully identifies the nodes 
disconnected from the sink in a very efficient manner and labelled those nodes as “dormant” 
nodes. More significantly, the algorithm partitions the node set N into two parts W and D=N-W, 
where D is the set of “dormant” nodes, and W is a set of nodes that are “awake”. The algorithm 
maintains  the  property that  their  never  is  an arc  of  the  “residual  network” directed from a 
dormant node to a node that is “awake”. This algorithm is used to find the  min-cut for each 
service flow graph GS.  The complexity and detail  analysis  of  the  min-cut algorithm [20] is 
beyond the scope of the paper.
5.3. Analysis & Discussion
The proposed fault analysis approach has been tested on various security implementations in a 
defined network with specific set  of  security policies.  It  is  to be noted that the verification 
module  (described  in  section 4)  capable  of  providing  the  correct  ACL  implementations 
corresponding to a given policy specification in a network. Table 5 shows the fault analysis on 
three  such  test  cases  of  implementations  (described  in  previous  section)  under  the  running 
example network.
The  result  shows  that  the  service  wise  fault  tolerance  values  corresponding  to  the 
Implementation1 and Implementation2 equal to 1 which means the implementations can tolerate 
at most 1-link failure (except the critical links). So, if their combined implementation scenario is 
considered (taking both  “ssh” and  “http” service flow graphs in account), the fault tolerance 
value for the network access model N (shown in Fig.3) is the minimum of these values which 
equals to 1. So, the complete network access model  can tolerate at  most  1-link failure as a 
whole. In this process, the fault tolerant parameter for any specific ACL implementation can be 
determined  which  indicates  the  maximum  number  of  link  failures  the  implementation  can 
tolerate and still satisfy the security policy of the network. It will help the network administrator 
to debug the ACL implementations in dynamic changes of network topology due to network 
link failures.
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5. CONCLUSION
In today's complex enterprise network (LAN), there is an increasing requirement of validating 
the  distributed security  implementations  with  the  organizational  global  security  policy with 
dynamic changes in the network topologies. Moreover, it is more challenging to ensure that the 
security implementation satisfies the global policy although there are certain link failures in the 
network. In this paper, we have proposed a complete security analysis framework which can 
verify  the  security  implementations  with  respect  to  a  defined  policy  specification  in  an 
enterprise LAN and also finds the fault tolerance parameter of a correct ACL implementation 
(under  network  link  failures).  The  efficacy  of  the  framework  has  been  aptly  demonstrated 
through examples  and  case  study.  The  proposed  framework  will  facilitate  in  debugging  of 
network security implementation efficiently in presence and absence of network link failures 
and designing conflict free global security policies in a enterprise network.
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